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And Still We Must Talk About “Real Rape”
SEXUAL ASSAULT AND THE JUSTICE GAP: A QUESTION OF ATTITUDE. By Jennifer Temkin & Barbara Krahé. Oxford & Portland, Oregon: Hart
Publishing. 2008. Pp. ix, 257. $63.00.
Reviewed by Elisabeth McDonald*
Over twenty years ago, Susan Estrich, in a 1986 article
that provided the basis for her influential book,1 made the following observations about non-traditional rapes, or those rapes
that are not “real”:
Where less force is used or no other physical injury is
inflicted, where threats are inarticulate, where the
two know each other, where the setting is not an alley
but a bedroom, where the initial contact was not a kidnapping but a date, where the women says no but does
not fight . . . . the law, as reflected in the opinions of
the courts, the interpretation, if not the words, of the
statutes, and the decisions of those within the criminal
justice system, often tell us that no crime has taken
place and that fault, if any is to be recognized, belongs
with the woman.2

In a 2008 echo of these words, Jennifer Temkin3 and Barbara Krahé4 report, in Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A
Question of Attitude, that:
An extensive body of research from social psychology and criminology demonstrates the influence of stereotypes and myths on judgments about rape. It
reveals widespread endorsement of the real rape stere* Associate Professor of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
I thank my colleague Dr. Yvette Tinsley for her advice, and Penelope Christoffel,
Robyn Greathead, and Simon Burt for their support (and distractions) during the
writing of this review.
1. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
2. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1092 (1986).
3. Professor of Law, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.
4. Professor of Psychology, University of Potsdam, Germany.
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otype which sets restrictive criteria for the definition
of rape in terms of strangers using force on victims behaving in accordance with normative expectations
about female role behaviour. Since only a small proportion of rapes actually meet these defining features,
the real rape stereotype effectively bars many women
from being acknowledged as victims of rape. . . .
The real rape stereotype is embedded in the wider
context of generalised beliefs about rape that stress
the victim’s responsibility for being assaulted, minimise the seriousness of sexual assault and exonerate
the perpetrator.5

As Temkin and Krahé establish, the less a sexual assault
looks like a “real rape”—because the complainant was previously in a sexual relationship with the defendant, had been
drinking, or willingly went home with the defendant—the more
likely the defendant will be acquitted.6 This much is not new.
Both before and after Estrich’s observations about “real rape,” a
significant amount of research and academic commentary,
across many jurisdictions, has come to the same conclusion.7
Further, it seems likely that the low conviction rates for rape
and the fact that victims of acquaintance rape have a very difficult time as complainants within the criminal justice system
may well contribute to the low reporting rate for sexual offenses
5. JENNIFER TEMKIN & BARBARA KRAHÉ, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND THE JUSTICE
GAP: A QUESTION OF ATTITUDE 50 (2008).
6. Id. at 45-46, 48.
7. See, e.g., N.S.W. DEP’T FOR WOMEN, HEROINES OF FORTITUDE: THE EXPERIENCE OF WOMEN AS VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (1996), available at http://
www.women.nsw.gov.au/Publications/Publications.htm; SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N,
DISCUSSION PAPER ON RAPE AND OTHER SEXUAL OFFENCES (2006), available at
http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/dp131_rape.pdf; NATALIE TAYLOR & JACQUELINE JOUDO, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, THE IMPACT OF PRE-RECORDED
VIDEO AND CCTV TESTIMONY BY ADULT SEXUAL ASSAULT COMPLAINANTS ON JURY
DECISION MAKING: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY, RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY SERIES,
NO. 68 (2005), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/rpp/68/RPP68.pdf;
VICTORIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON SEXUAL OFFENCES (2004),
available at http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/Law+Reform/resources/file/eb23784ec2a3402/B5FinalMergedReport.pdf; Elisabeth McDonald,
“Real Rape” in New Zealand: Women Complainants’ Experience of the Court Process, Y.B.N.Z. JURIS., 1997, at 59 [hereinafter McDonald, “Real Rape”]; DUBLIN
RAPE CRISIS CTR., SCH. OF LAW, TRINITY COLL., THE LEGAL PROCESS AND VICTIMS
OF RAPE (1998), available at http://www.drcc.ie/report/rapevic.pdf.
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against adult women.8 Temkin and Krahé refer to the discrepancy between reports of sexual victimization and convictions,
despite significant law reform measures over the last thirty
years, as the “justice gap.”9
Although the connection between rape myths and conviction rates has long been demonstrated, the need for a contemporary, scholarly study that compellingly reiterates this
connection is, perhaps aptly, provided by those legal practitioners interviewed as part of the authors’ UK-based research.10
When asked about the existence of the justice gap, only one of
the twenty-four interviewed (seventeen judges and seven barristers) “was prepared to concede that there was in fact a justice
gap.”11 “Other interviewees denied or showed resistance to this
idea, and some were plainly annoyed at the suggestion.”12 The
authors importantly go on to identify the contradiction between
this rejection of the notion of a justice gap—which a number of
interviewees described as a “concoction” of women’s groups13—
and the observations of the participants about the difficulties of
conviction when there is no “real rape”:
Many interviewees considered that the idea of a
justice gap was based on fundamental misunderstandings about the nature of rape cases in which so frequently it was one person’s word against another so
that the burden of proof would necessarily be very difficult for the prosecution to discharge. Yet they themselves had pointed to the problems in processing rape
caused by failures in evidence-gathering, weak prosecuting and reliance on stereotypical thinking, all of
which have a bearing on whether the burden of proof is
regarded by juries as having been satisfied.14

The authors’ research makes the case for the need to continue to talk about “real rape” and how the dissonance between
reports and convictions can be explained, not by lack of evi8. Mary Heath, Lack of Conviction: A Proposal to Make Rape Illegal in South
Australia, 27 AUST. FEM. L.J. 175, 177 (2007).
9. TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 1.
10. See id. at 125-58.
11. Id. at 139.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 140.
14. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
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dence, but by preconceived notions of what rape looks like and
how a “real victim” will act. Rather than explaining the justice
gap as a result of the difficulties of proof when credibility is the
main issue, Temkin and Krahé argue that “[p]erceptions of rape
are influenced by stereotypes, bias and gender prejudice. . . . [I]t
is this attitude problem that needs to be addressed if the justice
gap is to be reduced.”15 Judgments about sexual assault, the
authors say, are “skewed in the direction of low conviction rates
partly because of the widely held attitudes about rape which
undermine the position of the complainant and benefit the
defendant.”16
Again, there can be no real argument about the validity of
these claims from those working with victims or those involved
in researching the impact of rape law reforms. The original contribution this book makes to the literature in this area is that it
analyzes the existing research in order to reveal the impacts of
attitudinal bias, presents previously unpublished research
which is consistent with previous work, and suggests how attitudes may be changed so that law reforms will no longer be undermined by the actual practice.17 Instead of claiming the law
can provide the answers, although some further law reform is
proposed,18 the authors demonstrate that the attitudinal biases—the wide-spread subscription to rape mythology—can
only be effectively addressed by identifying and challenging
these biases. Law reform, alone, has clearly proven to be of little use in addressing the justice gap.
Having established the current need for such a publication,
this review will proceed with selective comment on the three
parts of the book. Part I, The Background, deals with the existing research on the justice gap, the role of rape stereotypes,
and the process of jury decision making.19 Part II, New Evidence, presents a series of empirical studies undertaken by the
authors, “which investigate the attitudinal problems underlying
the justice gap.”20 Part III, Some Possible Solutions, sets out
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
See id. at 3-5.
See id. at 161-76.
Id. at 9-71.
Id. at 4. See also id. at 75-158.
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reform options, covering education initiatives, as well as substantive and procedural reforms.21 Given the amount of information contained in this book, my comments will focus mainly
on the relevance of the work to developing proposals for change
in other jurisdictions, particularly that of the jurisdiction with
which I am most familiar, New Zealand. I conclude that Sexual
Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude is required
reading for all policy and lawmakers currently grappling with
how to address the “justice gap.”
I. The Background: Research on the Impact of Rape Myths
and Jury Decision Making on the Justice Gap
A. Reporting and Conviction Rates: The Problem of Attrition
The first chapter sets out statistical information from various jurisdictions—England and Wales, Germany, and the
United States—to demonstrate the extent of the problem of attrition, that is, the gap or “chasm”22 between offenses reported
to the police and the number of actual convictions.23 However,
as the authors point out, although the rate of reporting appears
to be rising, sexual offenses are still under-reported, and, as
some of those actually reported are classified as “no crime” by
the police,24 the number of convictions as compared to the actual number of offenses is even more concerning than the official statistics expose.25
The reasons that victims choose not to report sexual offenses include their own views about whether what happened to
them was a “real rape.”26 Even if an alleged victim believes she
was raped, she may conclude, however, that the police may not
agree.27 Research in the United States supports this analysis,
finding that the chances of a rape being reported increased
where there had been physical injury or the use of a weapon.28
Victims may also not report rape in order to avoid what they
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 161-207.
Id. at 10.
See id. at 11-21.
Id. at 17.
See id. at 10-14, 19-22.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13-14.
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know will be a difficult journey through the criminal justice system.29 High profile acquaintance rape cases, which have disclosed evidence of the complainant’s behavior and resulted in
acquittals, remind victims to be wary.30 Judges and lawyers acknowledge the trauma of being a complainant in a sexual assault case, some even stating publicly that they would advise a
family member not to report such an incident.31 Further research on the reasons for non-reporting is currently being undertaken in New Zealand, with a focus on addressing the rate of
attrition and increasing the rate of reporting.32
The low conviction rate for rape may also be a factor influencing low reporting rates. Temkin and Krahé examine the unfavorable conviction rate in England and Wales in 2004 for rape
(43% of those actually prosecuted) as compared with other violent offenses (71% for “other wounding” offenses, for example).33
In the United States, “conviction rates [for rape] measured in
terms of convictions as a proportion of reported offenses have
been shown to be well below that of other violent crimes.”34
These figures are almost identical to those in New Zealand for
2004 through 2006: 46% conviction rate for sexual offenses compared to 70% for total crime.35 Mary Heath found that in South
Australia in 2003, there was a 19% conviction rate for rape and
attempted rape, compared to a 41.4% conviction rate for a major

29. See N.Z. LAW COMM’N, DISCLOSURE TO COURT OF DEFENDANTS’ PREVIOUS
CONVICTIONS, SIMILAR OFFENDING, AND BAD CHARACTER, REP. 103, at v (2008),
available at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/Publication_
136_405_Disclosure_of_Previous_Convictions_Report_103_WEB.pdf [hereinafter
N.Z. LAW COMM’N, DISCLOSURE].
30. See id. at iv-vi.
31. See Elisabeth McDonald, Sexual Violence on Trial: Assisting Women Complainants in the Courtroom, WOMEN’S STUD. J., 2005, at 113 [hereinafter McDonald, Sexual Violence].
32. Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Sexual Violence Research Project, http://
www.mwa.govt.nz/our-work/svrproject (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
33. TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 21.
34. Id. at 23.
35. N.Z. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC DISCUSSION DOCUMENT: IMPROVEMENTS
TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE LEGISLATION IN NEW ZEALAND 2 n.5 (2008), available at http://
www.justice.govt.nz/discussion/sexual-violence-legislation/6064-2%20MOJ%20SV
%20discussion%20document-ff-WEB.pdf.
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assault.36 Conviction rates in Germany have been higher,37 but
this may not be the case for all European countries.38
Of course, the comparatively low conviction rate for rape
offenses only discloses part of the problem, which Temkin and
Krahé make apparent.39 The official statistics do not differentiate between conviction rates for “real rape” and conviction rates
for non-traditional or acquaintance rape. Research that does
differentiate between these two types of rape, whether it is
based on mock jury studies or qualitative work, indicates that
the conviction rate for “real rape” is significantly higher than
that for other forms.40 Therefore, the figure that would be most
alarming, if quantified, is the conviction rate for acquaintance
rape—either as a percentage of those prosecuted or as a percentage of the number actually reported. This is yet another
reason why it remains important to talk about what is and what
is not “real rape.” Temkin and Krahé go on to convincingly argue that women who have been victims of such non-traditional
rape will be less likely to report rapes in jurisdictions where the
conviction rate is low.41 Because of this trend, some writers
have questioned the wisdom of publicizing low conviction rates
“if it will make already low reporting rates fall lower still.”42
Over time, there have been law reform measures aimed at
addressing the low conviction and reporting rate. In Chapter 1,
and Appendix 1, the authors examine some of the legal modifications in England and Wales that have not delivered on their
promise and may need revision.43 These efforts include the revised definition of consent (in particular, the effect of complainant intoxication on consent and belief in consent),44 the
admissibility of sexual history evidence,45 the need for corroboration,46 and the rules relating to third party disclosure.47
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Heath, supra note 8, at 187.
TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 23.
Id.
See id.
See McDonald, “Real Rape,” supra note 7, at 60, 79.
TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 32.
Heath, supra note 8, at 177.
See TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 24-29, 235-44.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 236-42.
Id. at 235-36.
Id. at 243-44.
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These areas remain significant for most, if not all, common law
jurisdictions, and the need for on-going law reform will be discussed further in the consideration of Part III.
B. Rape Myths and Jury Decision-Making
The “real rape” stereotype involves “an attack by a stranger
on an unsuspecting victim in an outdoor location, involving the
use or threat of force by the assailant and active physical resistance by the victim.”48 Women violated in this way are expected
to make a “hue and cry”—an immediate complaint—and to be
distraught.49 They are not judged to be at fault in encouraging
or facilitating the offense.50 However, those victims whose experience deviates from the “real rape” stereotype—because they
knew the offender, it occurred in their own home, or they were
voluntarily under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time—
“are more likely to be blamed for the assault and less likely to
receive sympathetic treatment from others.”51 It is also not the
case, contrary to the myths related to the “real rape” stereotype,
that all victims will complain immediately or show “visible
signs of emotional agitation after the assault.”52 There also remains a firmly entrenched view in most jurisdictions that women are prone to falsely allege rape.53
Law reform measures, including the rules dealing with “recent complaint” evidence,54 control of the admission of sexual
history evidence, and revisions of the corroboration requirement
were aimed in part at addressing and challenging the myths
concerning “real rape” and the behavior of “real victims.”55
Rape myths are defined as “ ‘descriptive or prescriptive beliefs
about sexual aggression (i.e., about its scope, causes, context,
and consequences) that serve to deny, downplay or justify sexu48. Id. at 31.
49. See Julie Taylor, Rape and Women’s Credibility: Problems of Recantations
and False Accusations Echoed in the Case of Cathleen Crowell Webb and Gary Dotson, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 59, 75 (1987) (now HARV. J. L. & GENDER).
50. See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1092.
51. TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 32.
52. Id. at 33.
53. See id. at 138-39.
54. RICHARD MAHONEY, ELISABETH MCDONALD, SCOTT OPTICAN & YVETTE
TINSLEY, THE EVIDENCE ACT 2006, at 134 (2007).
55. See TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 145.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss2/6
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ally aggressive behavior that men commit against women.’ ”56
In Chapters 2 and 3, and further in Part II, the authors demonstrate how prevalent the belief in rape myth is and how adherence to these myths impacts the rate of reporting, the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion, the admissibility rulings of the judiciary, the performance of the prosecution and defense counsel,
the judges’ summation of the law and facts for the jury, the decision-making process, and jury verdicts.57 In other words, rape
myth acceptance has an insidious influence on every stage of
the criminal justice process with regard to the prosecution of
sexual offending.58 Therefore, in the authors’ view, it is the “attitude problem which needs to be addressed if the justice gap is
to be reduced.”59
In Chapter 2, the authors examine the research concerning
the police response to victims of sexual assault and the attribution of blame to either the victim or the offender, depending on
their respective behavior.60 The exhaustive synthesis of this research produces nothing new. However, the overwhelming consistency of the evidence certainly is disturbing. It is clear that
the closer the facts conform to the “real rape” stereotype, the
more likely police will categorize complaints as true.61 Complaints are more likely to be categorized as false or unlikely to
be true if the victim had delayed reporting, had previous consensual sex with the offender, or had been drunk at the time.62
Jurors are more likely to view the complainant as less credible,
and more to blame, if they know she previously had consensual
sex with the accused.63 Therefore, Temkin and Krahé conclude
that it is time to explore ways “in which people can be made to
engage in a proper assessment of the data available rather than
falling back on easy stereotypical answers . . . .”64 In order to
supplement the existing research with contemporary studies,
56. Id. at 34 (quoting Heike Gerger et al., The Acceptance of Modern Myths
About Sexual Aggression (AMMSA) Scale: Development and Validation in German
and English, 33 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 422, 425 (2007)).
57. See id. at 31-71, 125-58.
58. See id. at 50-51, 141-42, 158.
59. Id. at 1.
60. See id. at 38-48.
61. See id. at 38-40.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 45.
64. Id. at 50.
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the authors present their own recent research in Part II that for
the most part re-confirms the results of the previous work discussed in Part I and provides additional information about
those who are or will be involved in the criminal justice
system.65
II. New Evidence: Talking to Students, the Public and
the Professionals
In Part II, Temkin and Krahé present the findings of three
separate studies, as well as material from interviews with
judges and barristers.66 The authors appropriately claim that
the three studies are a new contribution to the research because
they provide “a systematic analysis of the single and joint contributions of case characteristics on the one hand, and the
preconceived attitudes of participants on the other.”67 The studies also make an original contribution, as they focus on “markedly under-researched groups with potential involvement in the
processing of rape cases within the criminal justice system
. . . .”68 These groups are “undergraduate law students (Study
1), graduate students training to be lawyers (Study 2), and
members of the general public who are eligible for jury service
(Study 3) . . . .”69 “The aim of the studies was to obtain a picture
of the extent to which judgments about rape cases are influenced by attitudes that lead individuals to be responsive to extra-legal factors and to pay less attention to case-based
information.”70
The explanation, analysis, and presentation of the three
studies are handled very effectively. The authors set out their
hypotheses, provide examples of the scenarios given to the participants, and clearly present the results.71 Temkin and Krahé
also do an excellent job of self-reflection and analysis of the
studies—identifying where and why problems with the method65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id. at 75-158.
See id.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 76-123.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol29/iss2/6
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ology might be present and how the results might be explained
in different ways.72
In Study 1, the participants, when dealing with the acquaintance rape scenario, “saw the defendant as less blameworthy, attributed more blame to the complainant and were less
certain that the incident was rape than in the classic stranger
rape.”73 However, all the scenarios presented “involved the use
of force by the defendant as well as active physical resistance
and a clear verbal statement of non-consent by the complainant.”74 The research also considered the influence of the participants’ “female precipitation beliefs” on their judgments of the
scenarios.75 The study found that “[w]hile participants’ female
precipitation beliefs did not play much of a role when they were
asked to judge the stranger rape . . . they were particularly influential in the [judgment of] the ex-partner rapes.76
In Study 2, the rape scenarios were extended to “include
situations where the complainant was affected by alcohol and
unable to resist.”77 This variation was important, because previous studies had shown “that when the complainant is intoxicated at the time of the assault, the case is considered less
credible and is less likely to lead to a guilty verdict than when
the complainant is sober at the time of the attack,”78 and concern had been expressed about the absence of clarity in the UK
legislation as to how intoxication should be taken into account.79 Thus, research on how juries will treat a complainant’s
intoxication is helpful in exploring reform options. Study 2 also
sought to examine whether rating the participants’ endorsement of female precipitation beliefs before, as compared to after
72. Id. at 84-85, 122, 123.
73. Id. at 84.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 79. “Participants’ endorsement of female precipitation as a cause of
rape” was measured by the degree that they believed that rape is caused by each of
six propositions: “(1) women who tease men; (2) women who allow men to intimately touch them; (3) women’s use of drugs or alcohol; (4) women who dress sexy;
(5) women allowing the situation to get out of control; and (6) women who do unsafe things (such as being out alone, hitch-hiking).” Id.
76. Id. at 84.
77. Id. at 86.
78. Id.
79. Philip N.S. Rumney & Rachel Anne Fenton, Intoxicated Consent in Rape:
Bree and Juror Decision-Making, 71 MOD. L. REV. 279, 286 (2008).
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their review of the scenarios, was statistically significant.80 In
other words, will the impact of rape myths on decisions be more
pronounced when they have been brought to the attention of the
participants immediately before the decision-making process?81
In this study “[t]he defendant was seen as significantly less
likely to be liable in the ex-partner scenarios than in the stranger cases . . . .”82 Recommended sentences were lower in the expartner cases, and the complainant received significantly more
blame.83 “[T]he acquaintance scenarios fell in between.”84 However, contrary to the authors’ hypothesis, “[n]either ratings of
defendant’s liability nor perceptions of complainant blame were
affected by” the use of force or by the complainant’s intoxication.85 Moreover, the participants with the highest acceptance
of female precipitation beliefs “were the only group whose perceptions of defendant liability were dependent on the defendant’s prior relationship with the complainant.”86 Complainant
blame also increased with this group, “regardless of whether
the defendant was alleged to have used force or exploited the
complainant’s incapacitated state.”87 Additionally, the authors
note that the findings of this study were “highly consistent with
those derived from a similar study conducted in Germany.88
In Study 3, 2,176 members of the general public in the
United Kingdom participated in an online survey using the rape
scenarios from Study 2.89 The type of relationship between the
complainant and the defendant also influenced decisions about
defendant liability and complainant blame in this study.90 Defendants were held more accountable, and the complainants
held less to blame, when the defendants used force, as opposed
to when they exploited the complainant’s intoxicated state.91
When the two variables were combined, however, the study
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 86-87.
See id.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 103, 105.
Id.
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found that defendant liability did not change in the alcohol-related cases, regardless of the type of relationship.92 And only in
the force scenarios did “perceptions of defendant liability decrease[ ] the closer the relationship between defendant and
complainant.”93
However, somewhat surprisingly, although complainant
blame in the force scenarios was related to the type of relationship—with “complainant blame . . . particularly high when the
defendant was an ex-partner”94—“in the alcohol-related cases
the complainant was blamed less where the defendant was an
ex-partner than when he was a stranger or an acquaintance.”95
The authors hypothesize that the “[p]articipants may have felt
the complainant should not have needed to be on her guard and
aware of the risk of sexual assault when interacting [and drinking] with a former partner . . . .”96 However, it is not clear why
that same consideration would not also have increased the liability of the defendant. Should he not be held more accountable
when taking advantage of a vulnerable ex-partner?
The final part of Study 3 dealt with the impact of a Home
Office educational poster campaign, which was aimed at raising
young men’s “awareness of the importance of consent . . . .97
Some participants in the study were shown a poster with a written paragraph about consent and the legal definition of rape,
others were shown the same poster without the paragraph, and
others were shown just the paragraph.98 However, the study
was “unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of the posters”:99
Whether or not the participants were shown the posters while judging the rape scenarios made practically
no difference to the way they perceived the liability of
a defendant who blatantly ignored the women’s expression of non-consent, and it had no effect on the
sentences they recommended if he was found guilty.
The consent paragraph also failed to have an impact,
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 103.
at 105.
at
at
at
at

117.
109.
113.
119.
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either on its own or in combination with the posters.
The only effect that did emerge was contrary to the
campaign’s objectives. The prison poster actually reduced ratings of defendant liability.100

The “prison poster” used in Study 3 displayed a cell containing a set of bunks with the top bunk occupied by a middleaged man looking out of the poster at the person who may well
occupy the bottom bunk and contained the caption: “If you don’t
get a ‘yes’ before sex, who’ll be your next sleeping partner?”101
The authors suggest that the reduced ratings of defendant liability by those viewing this poster occurred because
“[p]articipants may have asked themselves whether they would
want the defendant in the scenario to end up as shown on the
poster and may have tuned down their liability ratings in order
to protect him from such a fate.”102 The wording on the poster
may have even suggested that a defendant himself could be subject to sexual assault in prison—in fact, five percent of the interviewees in the Home Office’s own evaluation of the poster
campaign thought that the “message was if you rape you will
get raped in prison.”103
Temkin and Krahé’s evaluation of the effectiveness of the
this poster campaign is, therefore, a critical and timely reminder of the need to carefully design and test information intended to educate and address the justice gap104 and ties into
their proposals for educative strategies in Part III.
A. The Role of Gender: Implications for Policy Makers
At the conclusion of the discussion of the three studies, the
authors reflect on the difference that gender makes in decisions
about defendant liability, complainant blame, and acceptance of
rape myths (or female precipitation beliefs).105 In the earlier
presentation of the existing research, Temkin and Krahé note
that research has consistently shown that “rape myths are more
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 110.
Id. at 119.
Id.
See id. at 122-23.
See id. at 121-22.
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widely accepted among men than among women.”106 Further,
female police officers “tended to hold more positive attitudes towards victims than male officers,”107 and “men are more disposed than women to blame the victim.”108 However, as the
authors argue, “one of the reasons for the greater willingness of
men to blame the victim and exonerate the perpetrator might
be their greater acceptance of rape myths, including the belief
that women precipitate rape through the way they behave.”109
And it is seemingly the case that men are more lenient generally, not just when assessing defendant liability in the case of
heterosexual rape.110
When considering the effect of gender, Temkin and Krahé
conclude “that the crucial determinant of judgments about rape
cases is the extent to which people subscribe to rape myths.
Thus it tends to be attitudes rather than an unbiased evaluation of the facts which determine judgments in these cases.”111
This conclusion again validates the authors’ focus on identifying
and changing attitudes. However, it is also the case “that men
subscribe to rape myths to a greater extent than women”—
which two of the authors’ studies also found.112 From this perspective, gender may have an indirect effect on perceptions of
rape cases. But because women also subscribe to rape myths,
the focus for change should be on altering attitudes, not on addressing gender balance within the criminal justice system.113
This conclusion has important implications for policy decisions
and law reform options and is one that should be noted by lobbyists and legislators in all jurisdictions.
B. Views from the Bench and Bar: The Lack of SelfReflection
In Chapters 6 and 7, which I consider to be two of the most
compelling and concerning portions of their book, Temkin and
Krahé present the results of a qualitative interview study with
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 36.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 43-44.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 121.
Id.
See id. at 122.
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a group of seventeen judges and seven barristers.114 A summary of the interview schedule is included in Appendix 2 of the
book,115 although the interviewees were encouraged “to go beyond those questions to address issues they considered important in the way rape was dealt with by the courts.”116 The
excerpts from these interviews are presented in a clear and
well-structured manner. The quotes from the interviewees are
grouped together under topic headings that are familiar to the
reader—for example, “The Influence of Rape Stereotypes”117
and “Attributing Blame to the Victim”118—as well as those topics of particular relevance to the expertise of the interviewees—
“Incompetent Prosecuting Counsel”119 and “Judges’ Attitudes
towards Complainants.”120
These chapters are essential reading for policy makers, especially those proposing change within common law jurisdictions. In my view, research investigating the attitudes of legal
practitioners working in the criminal justice system, especially
in the areas of sexual and domestic violence, should be undertaken in a more frequent and rigorous manner, even though
working with judges in such circumstances is difficult.121 Although the chapters contain much useful information that provides insight into judicial decision making, the overall message
is that the interviewees are often apt to find fault with persons
other than themselves.122
Specifically, fault was found with the police, who were considered to be poor at gathering evidence, taking statements, and
challenging a complainant’s story at an early stage in the
114. See id. at 126-42, 143-58.
115. See id. at 245-46.
116. Id. at 126.
117. Id. at 132.
118. Id. at 133.
119. Id. at 130.
120. Id. at 131.
121. The recent government-funded research conducted in New Zealand initially intended to include interviews with members of the judiciary as part of the
work ascertaining the views of legal professionals working within the criminal justice system. See Ministry of Women’s Affairs, supra note 32. However, access to
the judiciary for this purpose was denied following an application to the Judicial
Research Committee.
122. See TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 142.
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case.123 Defense counsel were viewed as “behaving badly” because of the tactics used, in some cases, to discredit the complainant.124 Concern was expressed over the “inexperience and
incompetence of prosecuting counsel.”125 Juries were described
as having “totally unrealistic expectations of how genuine victims should behave,”126 willing to decide cases not on the facts
but “in the light of their own experience,”127 and having “difficulty drawing inferences from the facts and the evidence.”128
Although the interviewees were reluctant to be self-critical,
the study does reveal some of their attitudes—including some
that concern the authors. While some of the interviewees’ observations were consistent with social science research—for example, identifying cases as “sure-fire losers”129 when they
involve “estranged couples, date rapes where some consensual
intimacy had taken place, or cases where the girl was drunk
and found a man having sex with her”130—the interviewees’ beliefs about the influence of female jurors in the decision-making
process did “not accord with psychological research which . . . .
demonstrate[s] that women are more inclined to hold defendants liable . . . .”131 Further, interviewees “commonly distinguished between ‘serious’ rapes and others,”132 with one
barrister (identified as “B4”) expressing the view that “nonstranger rape was not necessarily that serious and that if the
public thought it was, there would be more of an uproar about
the poor conviction rate.”133
Some of us, in fact, might believe that we are in the middle
of an uproar. This is certainly the case in New Zealand as a
result of a series of high-profile cases involving alleged historical gang rapes by serving police officers.134 While B4 expressed
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 127-29.
Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
Id.
See N.Z. LAW COMM’N, DISCLOSURE, supra note 29, at iv. See also LOUISE
NICHOLAS & PHILIP KITCHIN, LOUISE NICHOLAS: MY STORY (2007).
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the view that the public is not sufficiently concerned about the
low conviction rates, the other interviewees stated that the “justice gap” is a “concoction of ‘pressure groups,’ i.e., women’s
groups, or . . . outside influences.”135 Thus, the public is
presented both as not sufficiently concerned about the low conviction rate and as inappropriately representing the low conviction rate problem. As Temkin and Krahé note, “[i]t is not at all
surprising that interviewees demonstrated firm resistance to
the idea of a ‘justice gap’ since this could easily be interpreted
as an attack on the legal profession as well as the criminal justice system as a whole.”136 Therefore—and the significant contribution of this book is to make this very point—the attitudes
that need altering for the justice gap to be successfully addressed must include the attitudes of those in the legal
profession.137
The authors conclude Chapter 6 by observing that “[t]he
judges failed to mention that they too, as a group, might be implicated in the problems surrounding rape trials through their
own attitudes which affect the way they apply the law.”138 To
expose the attitudes behind judicial application of the law,
Temkin and Krahé present, in Chapter 7, the interviewees’
views on some of the relevant law reform—that relating to the
corroboration requirement, third party disclosure, and sexual
history evidence.139
C. Admissibility of Sexual History Evidence: The “Law in
Action”
One of the earlier law reforms, with regard to evidence in
sexual offense trials, concerned the limitation on the admissibility of the complainant’s sexual history with people other than
the defendant.140 This reform was aimed at preventing juries
from using such evidence when assessing the complainant’s
credibility, as well as reducing the unpleasantness that com135. TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 140.
136. Id. at 141.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 142.
139. See id. at 143-58.
140. See id. at 236. The United Kingdom put forth this reform in 1976. Id.
New Zealand, however, established this reform in 1977. See Evidence Act, 1908,
§ 23A (N.Z.).
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plainants reported feeling when testifying about previous intimate relationships.141
To admit sexual history evidence, according to most “rape
shield statutes,” the evidence must meet a heightened relevance
standard.142 In section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal
Evidence Act,143 after it is established that the evidence is relevant to a limited number of issues,144 the ultimate admissibility
test is that “a refusal of leave might have the result of rendering
unsafe a conclusion of the jury or (as the case may be) the court
on any relevant issue in the case.”145 The New Zealand
equivalent of this law requires that the evidence be “of such relevance to a fact in issue that to exclude it would be contrary to
the interests of justice.”146 Despite these seemingly strict standards for admissibility,147 academic analysis of the decisions
made in accordance with discretionary rules demonstrates the
fundamental problem with law reform that is enacted in order
to prevent decision makers from placing undue weight on a
complainant’s sexual experience.148 A law that is aimed at
changing attitudes will not be effective if it is to be implemented
by those who subscribe to those same attitudes.149 It is even
more problematic that most members of the judiciary do not believe that they bring their own biases to the bench.150
Although section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act replaced an earlier, less structured law,151 Temkin
and Krahé report that the new section is also the “object of criti141. See N.Z. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RAPE STUDY: DISCUSSION OF LAW AND PRAC(1983); E.W. Thomas, Was Eve Merely Framed or Was She Forsaken?,
N.Z.L.J., October 1994, at 368.
142. MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 184.
143. 1999, c. 23, § 41 (Eng. & Wales).
144. Id. §§ 3, 5.
145. Id. § 41.
146. Evidence Act, 2006, § 44 (N.Z.).
147. R. v. McClintock, [1986] 2 N.Z.L.R. 99, 103 (C.A.).
148. See TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 148-50, 236-37.
149. See id. at 237 (“[T]he principal structural flaw of such legislative schemes
is their failure to define the key concepts for determining admissibility leaving the
judges free rein to apply their ‘common sense’ assumptions.” (quoting Terese Henning & Simon Bronitt, Rape Victims on Trial: Regulating the Use and Abuse of
Sexual History Evidence, in BALANCING THE SCALES 76, 85 (Patricia Eastal ed.,
1998))).
150. See id. at 143, 158.
151. Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 1976, c. 82, §§ 1-7 (Eng. & Wales).
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cism and controversy.”152 The interviewees in the authors’
study believed that the new section is too restrictive and has the
potential to exclude relevant evidence.153 Six of the judges interviewed also determined that it preserved their discretion to
admit evidence—although the aim of the reform was to remove
discretion.154 One judge stated: “I’m not one for being unduly
fettered. I’ve been appointed to do a job on the basis that I have
a certain amount of judgment, and to be fettered or shackled by
statutory constraints, I don’t think helps anybody.”155
The inability or unwillingness of some of the judges participating in this research to apply the new law, which was enacted
in order to effectively control admission of sexual history evidence, is a real concern and demonstrates the limitations of law
reform. Nearly half of the judges in this study were also unaware of, or ignored, the procedural requirements of the reform—“that defense applications to bring in evidence of the
complainant’s sexual history [be] made in writing before
trial. . . . [i]n order that only properly considered applications
are made and that the prosecution has time to challenge
them.”156 A proposal that would have required parties to file
their applications before trial and judges to provide their reasons for admitting such evidence in writing was considered but
rejected by the New Zealand Law Commission on the basis that
the notice requirement would be ignored and that the judges
should not be compelled to record their rulings.157 Although
this was a disappointing decision, in light of the attitude toward
the English provision, it may have been a realistic and pragmatic one.
In conclusion, the authors offer a critical assessment of the
impact judges’ attitudes have on the justice gap:
Thus, the interviews with judges and barristers
raise issues about the extent to which the law laid
down by Parliament and the higher courts for rape
152. TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 240.
153. See id. at 146-47.
154. Id. at 148.
155. Id. at 149.
156. Id. at 146.
157. This information is based on my discussions with the Commissioner in
charge of the Evidence Project, Judge Margaret Lee, during my time working at
the Law Commission.
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and sexual assault cases is being judicially observed.
It is the gap between the law and the law in action
which is an essential component of the justice chasm
in sex cases. It seems that law itself, which must ultimately be interpreted and applied by the judges, cannot entirely withstand an attitude problem which, in
some cases, is too entrenched to budge.158

Having made the case that something more than law reform is required in order to address the justice gap, the authors
consider options for change in Part III.
III. Some Possible Solutions
A. Law Reform: Expert Evidence, Evidence of Good
Character, Sexual History, Consent and Intoxication
Chapter 8 deals with law reform proposals.159 This includes consideration of the increased use of expert evidence in
cases of sexual offenses in order to address the common misconceptions concerning victims.160 Temkin and Krahé examine the
reform possibilities excellently, while also discussing the arguments for and against the use of expert evidence.161 This discussion supplements the earlier consideration of the issue in
Chapter 3.162
The authors conclude that the prosecution should be allowed “to import expert evidence into rape trials on those occasions when it considers that this would be useful.”163 Expert
evidence could potentially be admitted under the new admissibility rule in New Zealand, which requires that the fact-finder
be “likely to obtain substantial help from the [expert] opinion in
understanding other evidence in the proceeding or in ascertaining any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
proceeding.”164 Although Temkin and Krahé mention that the
prosecution can offer expert evidence when that evidence would
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 158.
See id. at 161-76.
Id. at 162.
See id. 161-67.
Id. at 57-63.
Id. at 167.
Evidence Act, 2006, § 25 (N.Z.) (emphasis added).
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be useful for the prosecution’s case,165 it is the judge who rules
on the admissibility and may not be easily convinced that there
is real need for such evidence. Thus, changes to law or procedure that require the favorable exercise of judicial discretion
may well be defeated in practice if not implemented in the context of attitudinal change.
The authors consider the case for allowing the complainant
to offer “good character” evidence about herself in order to “obtain some parity with the accused,”166 who has historically been
permitted to present “good character” evidence to assess both
his credibility, if the defendant testifies, and his guilt.167 The
New Zealand Evidence Act of 2006168 provides that any party,
including the complainant in a sexual assault case, may offer
evidence in support of his or her veracity (credibility) when that
evidence is “substantially helpful” in assessing that person’s veracity169 and may also offer propensity (character) evidence
when it is relevant.170 Although there are no reported decisions
on the use of these provisions, the mechanism is in place for
such “parity” to occur, provided, of course, that the prosecution
is willing to use such evidence, and the judge is willing to admit
it.171
The authors’ recommendations concerning sexual history
evidence relate mainly to the non-compliance with the procedural requirements.172 However, it will presumably be important
in England and Wales, as elsewhere, to keep monitoring the decisions made under the relevant rape shield statutes. The New
Zealand Evidence Act significantly changed this rule by barring
any evidence of the complainant’s reputation in sexual matters.173 As I have argued elsewhere, this is a welcome change
165. See TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 167.
166. Id. at 168.
167. MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 157.
168. Evidence Act, 2006 (N.Z.).
169. Id. § 37.
170. Id. § 40.
171. However, note the effect of offering biographical information about the
parties. See TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 49 (“By having more detailed information about a person, he or she becomes more prominent in the perceiver’s
awareness and is therefore a more likely candidate to be selected as responsible for
the events in question.”).
172. Id. at 168-69.
173. MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 184.
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but one that may well be defeated in practice.174 It is worth noting that the New Zealand Law Commission recommended extending the section’s control over the evidence of the
complainant’s sexual experience with a particular defendant;175
however, during the legislative process, this recommendation
was rejected.176
The final law reform measure discussed is that concerning
the connection between consent and intoxication.177 The authors recall their earlier observations in Chapter 8, that “if the
complainant is portrayed as drunk, she is perceived as less
credible and the perpetrator is seen as less likely to be culpable. . . . The findings suggest that the issue of victim intoxication is closely related to the perception of victim culpability.”178
This connection clearly needs to be challenged and addressed,
and the reform required may well be jurisdiction-specific, as it
will relate to what the law or practice already provides. Temkin
and Krahé propose that the United Kingdom’s Sexual Offences
Act of 2003179 “should be amended to make it plain that there
can be no consent when the complainant was or becomes unconscious, or where she is mistaken as to the nature of the proposed act.”180 The latter recommendation is important in light
of the England and Wales Court of Appeal’s recent decision in
R. v. Bree.181

174. Elisabeth McDonald, Complainant’s Reputation in Sexual Matters,
N.Z.L.J., Aug. 2007, at 251.
175. N.Z. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 25.
176. MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 185.
177. See TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 174-75.
178. Id. at 169-70.
179. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42 (Eng. & Wales).
180. TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 175.
181. [2007] EWCA (Crim) 256 (Eng. & Wales). See also Sharon Cowan, The
Trouble with Drink: Intoxication, (In)capacity, and the Evaporation of Consent to
Sex, 41 AKRON L. REV. 899, 908-09 (2008) (“Sir Judge stated in Bree that it is the
role of the court to decide whether or not the woman’s capacity has been diminished to the degree that consent is not possible, and that this is not an issue that
can be appropriately decided by a statutory tariff system.”); Rumney & Fenton,
supra note 79, at 283.

23

\\server05\productn\P\PLR\29-2\PLR206.txt

372

unknown

Seq: 24

PACE LAW REVIEW

26-MAY-09

11:46

[Vol. 29:349

B. Improving Rape Trials: Assisting the Jury and Educating
Legal Professionals
Temkin and Krahé also consider the possibility of abolishing the jury in sexual assault cases.182 While acknowledging
that such a proposal would meet fierce opposition, they make a
strong case for having conviction decisions made by a judge
alone.183 “Rape-ticketed judges,”184 they argue, are far less
likely to be led astray by defense counsel, as they are “familiar
with patterns of sexual aggression and are more likely to be
able to draw the inferences which can and should be drawn
from the evidence.”185
The authors also express the view that, although judges
may also subscribe to rape myths, and training judges is not
without problems, “structures are now in place and can be built
on whereas no such opportunities to educate juries could ever
be built into the system.”186 Those who believe that the jury is
best suited to make decisions about guilt in cases of serious offenses express faith in the number of jurors: “Somehow the common sense and judgment that you get out of twelve people, is, I
think, amazing and amazingly valuable.”187
The authors do not, however, consider other options that
may provide a compromise, such as having more than one judge
on the bench in sexual assault cases or adopting other variations found in the civil law model. More generally, I expected
the authors to provide a fuller consideration of relevant aspects
of an inquisitorial model, given the comparative work that has
been done with regard to sexual assault already188 and the authors’ expertise.
Assuming that the current jury system is likely to remain,
at least in the short term, Temkin and Krahé consider ways
that the jury might be assisted in making decisions without re182. See TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 177-80.
183. See id. at 178-80.
184. “Rape-ticketed” judges are judges “specifically licensed to try rape cases”
in the English court system. Id. at 126.
185. Id. at 178.
186. Id. at 178-79.
187. Id. at 179. See also N.Z. LAW COMM’N, JURIES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, REP.
69, at 48-49 (2001), available at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/Publication_76_161_R69.pdf.
188. See, e.g., DUBLIN RAPE CRISIS CTR., supra note 7.
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lying on stereotypical thinking and, instead, by focusing on the
facts of the case.189 The authors briefly mention the possibility
of adopting a voir dire process of jury selection190—as used in
the United States—before discussing what help the jury may be
given in terms of flow charts, notebooks, access to witness statements, the judge’s summation of the law and facts for the jury,
and the like.191 The authors note that, although “jurors in England and Wales are permitted to ask questions . . . research
studies show a distinct inhibition about doing so.”192 Section
101 of the New Zealand Evidence Act codifies a process by
which a jury may put a question to a witness.193 This section
caused some disquiet among New Zealand judges, who worried
about a dramatic increase in jury questions.194 Nonetheless,
even though some judges do inform their juries of the right to
ask questions, as advised by the Law Commission,195 this practice does not seem to have had any negative impact on the trial
process in terms of length or complication.
The final part of Chapter 9 deals with the education of legal
professionals and consideration of the value of appointing more
women judges.196 Temkin and Krahé note that although increased education is desirable, judges are “notoriously difficult
to educate.”197 The United States is viewed as leading the way
in terms of “developing an understanding of judicial gender
bias.”198 However, it is not just an unwillingness to acknowledge gender bias in decision making that may prevent effective
judicial education. Two myths also need to be overcome: “ ‘First,
that ‘only judges can teach judges,’ second, that judges should
not take into account social science data . . . .’ ”199
189. See TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 181-88.
190. Id. at 180-81.
191. Id. at 181-86.
192. Id. at 185.
193. Evidence Act, 2006, § 101 (N.Z.)
194. See N.Z. LAW COMM’N, EVIDENCE: REFORM OF THE LAW, REP. 55, at 115
(1999), available at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/
Publication_55_155_R55%20Vol%201.pdf.
195. MAHONEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 366.
196. See TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 188-96.
197. Id. at 188.
198. Id. at 189.
199. Id. at 188 (quoting LYNN HECHT SCHAFRAN & NORMA J. WIKLER, STATE
JUSTICE INST., NAT’L JUDICIAL EDUC. PROGRAM, GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS:
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“In Canada, judicial training has included [consideration
of] ‘social context,’ ”200 which is designed to assist judges in “ ‘explor[ing] their own assumptions, biases and views of the world
with a view to reflecting on how these may interact with judicial
process.’”201 However, despite Temkin and Krahé’s claim that
New Zealand has followed the United States’ lead by introducing gender bias training, this statement seems based on only an
article about India that cites a 1994 report authored by a woman judge from New Zealand.202 Unfortunately, any training
that is offered to address gender bias seems only to account for
a small portion of the introductory training curriculum for new
judges.203 Moreover, judges did not unanimously agree with the
recent suggestion that “social context” materials be included as
part of the judicial education on New Zealand’s evidence and
procedure rules.204
It is clear that effective training of legal professionals, in
order to “tackle” the attitude problem,205 is essential and long
overdue, especially in common law jurisdictions outside North
America. As Temkin and Krahé argue, based on the results of
the social science research they discuss, the answer is not appointing more women judges but rather “judicial education
aimed at dispelling rape myths held by both female and male
judges . . . .”206
The authors note that the training of “rape-ticketed” judges
and crown prosecutors who deal with sexual assault is laudable,
although such training is not extended to defense counsel.207
Temkin and Krahé do not, however, consider the possibility of
specialist sexual assault courts, which are used elsewhere in
ACTION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 30 (2001), available at http://womenlaw.stanford.
edu/genderfairness-strategiesproject.pdf).
200. Id. at 190.
201. Id. (quoting T.B. Dawson, The Social Context Education Project (2004)
(unpublished report on file with the National Judicial Institute Canada)).
202. Id.
203. This information is the result of an informal conversation I had with the
Director of the Institute of Judicial Studies.
204. This opinion is based on my interactions with judges that I worked with
in this training program.
205. TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 196.
206. Id. (emphasis added).
207. See id. at 126, 130-31.
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the world.208 New Zealand has also introduced specialist family
violence courts with some success.209 Despite the drawbacks of
specialized courts,210 such a model addresses the issues concerning education and attitudinal change and seems worthy of
investigation.
C. Changing Public Attitudes
Chapter 10 “reviews existing approaches designed to challenge rape myths and outlines directions for future efforts towards this goal.”211 Public education is, of course, relevant not
only to the prevention of sexual assault but also to the jury decision-making process and the perception of harm for victims
themselves. As Temkin and Krahé note, rape prevention programs need to be provided early, and any use of the media for
education or raising awareness must be thoughtfully considered
and evaluated.212 Changing public attitudes is critical for effective challenge to the justice gap, and this is recognized in many
jurisdictions, including New Zealand.213 The work that clearly
remains is how to actually accomplish this, and Chapter 10
proves a helpful starting point for answering this question.
IV. Conclusion
In Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude, Temkin and Krahé conclude that stereotypical beliefs
about what “real rape” is affect “the judgments made by individuals dealing with rape cases . . . and thereby shape the understanding of rape as it is represented and dealt with in the
criminal justice system.”214 The authors’ original research and
consideration of existing research convinces the reader that the
difference between reports and convictions can be explained,
not by a lack of evidence, but by preconceived notions of what
rape looks like and how a “real” victim will act. Rather than the
208. See McDonald, Sexual Violence, supra note 31, at 123.
209. See New Zealand Ministry of Justice, Family Violence Courts—Information for Victims, http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/courts-publications/family-violence-courts/301.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2008).
210. McDonald, Sexual Violence, supra note 31, at 124.
211. TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 199.
212. Id. at 207.
213. See Ministry of Women’s Affairs, supra note 32.
214. TEMKIN & KRAHÉ, supra note 5, at 209.
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justice gap being a result of the difficulties of proof in rape
cases, Temkin and Krahé argue that “[p]erceptions of rape are
influenced by stereotypes, bias and gender prejudice. . . . [I]t is
this attitude problem which needs to be addressed if the justice
gap is to be reduced.”215
The book presents particularly compelling evidence about
the attitudes of members of the judiciary—those charged with
applying the laws crafted to address the justice gap—demonstrating that they are also not without bias and have a tendency
to subscribe to rape myths.216 Instead of claiming that the law
can provide the answers, since legal reform has been of limited
use, the authors demonstrate that the widespread attitudinal
biases can only be effectively addressed by identifying and challenging these biases.
As jurisdictions throughout the world continue to struggle
to address the problem of low conviction rates in cases which do
not involve a “real rape,” it is time to take a different approach
in order to provide justice for victims, while not simultaneously
undermining a defendant’s right to a fair trial. Sexual Assault
and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude provides a timely
and well-crafted argument for the different approach that is
needed. It should be required reading for all policy and
lawmakers, especially those working within adversarial criminal justice systems, and I have commended the work to New
Zealand’s Ministry of Justice.217

215. Id. at 1.
216. See supra notes 126-38, 153-58 and accompanying text.
217. Elisabeth McDonald, Public Discussion Document: Submission on Improvements to Sexual Violence Legislation in New Zealand (Oct. 10, 2008) (unpublished comment, on file with the author).
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